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ABSTRACT 
Curnett, Brian T. M.S., Purdue University, May 2015. Password Strength Analysis: User 
Coping Mechanisms in Password Selection. Major Professor: Melissa Dark. 
 
 
The security that passwords provide could be seriously flawed due to the way people cope 
with having to memorize and recall their passwords. The National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) standard that is used to measure the password strength, known as 
entropy, is designed for a single use and does not consider that users may choose to keep 
parts of their password across password changes. This study shows that a portion of users 
keep some information from previous passwords across changes. These habits which will 
be called coping mechanisms that over time serve to erode the protection provided by 
passwords past the minimum level of security provided by the password policy which can 
place both individuals and enterprises into danger. This is made even more apparent with 
data breaches become a common p
password to the world. It was found that the minimum level of security can no longer be 
provided after one disclosure of passwords in the Comprehensive 8 password policy, and 
after two disclosures in passwords in the Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 policy. Coping 
mechanisms are most prevalent in password policies that have many requirements placed 
on users. The Comprehensive 8 policy showed the most coping followed by the Blacklist 
Hard and Basic 16 policies. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an introduction and overview of the research project. The 
introduction includes a background of the research, the significance of the research, the 
research questions, assumption, limitations, delimitations, and the definitions of 
terminology that will be used throughout. 
 
1.1. Background 
Even though passwords have been used for as long as people have needed 
authentication, password strength analysis is an ongoing subject of research. There are 
many viewpoints that can be taken on the security of passwords from the cryptographic 
approach which has resulted in the hashing and salting of passwords to the network 
administrators viewpoint of policies and standard requirements both becoming standard 
practice (Klein, 1990 ; Zviran & Erlich, 2006). There is not currently a consensus within 
arguments as to how to best protect many systems. Passwords still remain a relatively 
inexpensive option for authentication and appear to be here to stay (Furnell & Zekri, 2006). 
While passwords are a dominant authentication measure, weaknesses must be addressed in 
order to protect all of the users whose information depends upon the security that 
passwords provide. A password is only as strong as the user creates it to be. Weaknesses 
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need to be examined in this creation process to see how much users cope with policy 
restrictions by using known information, partially repeating past passwords, and using 
easily identifiable patterns. Then these coping mechanisms can be examined to determine 
how they can serve to erode the strength of password policies over time. 
 
1.2. Significance 
 This study will concentrate on identifying the user habits that will be identified as 
coping mechanisms. Most studies in the field of password strength analysis will take a 
This study is separated by the fact that it will analyze user 
behavior across several iterations of time. This way, the evolution of the password will be 
a username and at least one password. 
 
1.3. Statement of Purpose 
 This study will focus on identifying coping mechanisms that will remain within 
NIST model of entropy in an attempt to show the reduction of the effective key space that 
these coping mechanisms will cause in the password as time progresses. 
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1.4. Research Questions 
1. What is the prevalence of the coping mechanisms to which users engage by policy 
and across iterations? 
Using known information 
Partial repetition 
Easily identifiable patterns 
2. To what extent do users engage in coping mechanisms by policy and across 
iterations? 
3. Do user coping mechanisms decrease the strength of password policies to such a 
degree that the increase of security sought by the stringent policy is negated? 
 
1.5. Assumptions 
1. The participants will respond truthfully during survey questions. 
2. At the start of each iteration all previous iterations passwords as well as the 
username will become known.  
 
1.6. Limitations 
1. Participants in this study live in the United States limiting the applicability across 
the world. This may be relevant if coping habits are structured differently in other 
languages and in other regions the primary language may not be English. 
2. The sample population of Mechanical Turk users may not be representative of the 
average user as no demographic information is available for this population. 
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3. No personally identifiable information will be collected in this study. If any coping 
mechanisms are based in using personally identifiable information, names, 
addresses, birth dates, etc., these mechanisms will not be identified in this study. 
 
1.7. Delimitations 
1. Only seven iterations of password changes will be collected. 
2. Passwords that are reused across accounts cannot be accounted for within the data 
set. 
1.8. Definitions 
Coping Mechanisms  Any behavior that serves to transfer information across password 
changes or to reduce the effective key space of a password.  
Basic 16  A password policy that asks the user to create a password of at least 16 
characters in length (Kelley, et al., 2012).  
Blacklist Hard  A password policy that requires the user to create a password of at least 8 
characters in length. This password is then checked against a dictionary blacklist 
and if the password is on the dictionary blacklist it requires the user to choose a 
new password (Kelley, et al., 2012). 
Comprehensive 8  A password policy that requires a password to be at least 8 characters 
long and contain at least 1 lowercase letter, 1 capital letter, 1 number, and 1 special 
character (Kelley, et al., 2012).  
Dictionary blacklist  A collection of commonly used words that are banned from use as 
passwords. 
Entropy  The standard unit of measurement for password strength. 
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Memorability  The ease that a user can remember a password. 
Password  A set of characters known by a user and a system used to authenticate the 
identity of a user. 
Password Policies  The minimum requirements placed on the user. 
Post Coping Mechanism Entropy  The entropy of a password after coping mechanisms 
have been analyzed for their effect on security. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review examines a collection of disciplines in order to provide the sufficient 
background information necessary for research into password strength analysis. This 
chapter includes sections on the origin of passwords, entropy, human memory, and coping 
mechanisms. The first section describes passwords  origins, associated terminology, and 
metrics. The second gives a cognitive psychology perspective on how the human mind will 
view passwords and the associated phenomena. The final section details the what, why, 
and how we use coping mechanisms. 
 
2.1. Passwords: An Origin and why we need them after all these years 
Passwords can trace their lineage back to the ancient Roman military. Then known 
as watchwords, passwords were used to verify the identity of troops (Eaton, 2011). The 
Availability, also known as the CIA spectrum in information security, are still needed to 
insure that the person accessing a piece of information is indeed the person who should be 
accessing the information. Passwords fit well within the CIA spectrum. Passwords help 
keep data confidential by ensuring that only the people who know the secret, a password, 
have access to the data. Passwords only work if they themselves  
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remain confidential. By ensuring only people who have the appropriate clearance have 
availability to people who do not know the secret password. However, if a password is 
forgotten, it can easily deny availability to the intended user.  Traditionally this has been 
done by using one or more of three authentication techniques; something you have, 
something you are, or something you know. Debates about which of these techniques is 
the best or which should be used together are ongoing and not the subject of this literature 
review. This paper solely focuses on how passwords fall into the last category of 
authentication, something you know, and how certain coping mechanisms erode the 
security that they provide. 
 
2.2. Entropy: How to Measure Passwords 
Entropy in units of bits is the measurement of the strength of a password. A simple 
definition of entropy provided by Shay, Komanduri, Kelley, Leon, Marzurek, Bauer, 
Cristin, an
(1948) simply measured all possible passwords that could be contained within a key space. 
So, a pa  
 
Where L, Length, is the number of characters in the password, and N is the number 
2 to the power of the entropy of the password to find the total number of possible 
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passwords. The post coping entropy measurement used later can be converted the same 
way in order to determine the number of attempts needed for a password cracker to find 
the password. When using entropy as a measure of password strength in this method it 
assumes that all passwords within a key space are equally likely. When dealing with human 
generated passwords this assumption is broken completely. In 2004, Burr, Dodson, and 
Polk at the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
measure of the amount of uncertainty that an attacker faces to determine the value of a 
-63 provided a model 
accurate entropy (Burr, Dodson, & Polk, 
2004). 
NIST Special Publication 800-63 of June 2004 suggests the following 
scheme to roughly estimate the entropy of human-generated passwords  
 The entropy of the first character is four bits; 
 The entropy of the next seven characters are two bits per character; 
 The ninth through the twentieth character has 1.5 bits of entropy per 
character; 
 Characters 21 and above have one bit of entropy per character. 
 A "bonus" of six bits is added if both upper case letters and non-alphabetic 
characters are used. 
 A "bonus" of six bits is added for passwords of length 1 through 19 
characters following an extensive dictionary check to ensure the password 
is not contained within a large dictionary. Passwords of 20 characters or 
more do not receive this bonus because it is assumed they are pass-phrases 
consisting of multiple dictionary words. 
This set of policies put forward by NIST serves as a foundation for most modern 
commercial password systems and allows a system administrator an easy metric to design 
the password policy for their organization. In order to create policies that will hopefully 
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cause strong password creation by users, organizations use this NIST entropy to determine 
the strength of a password. Examples, of password policies would be Comprehensive 8, 
Blacklist Hard, and Basic 16. (Kelley, et al., 2012) Where the minimum entropy in these 
policies are 24 bits, 24 bits and 30 bits respectively. Thus, the greater the entropy, the more 
difficult it is for a hacker to predict the value of a variable, and therefore gain access to the 
protected information. All of this information is taken into consideration when forming a 
password policy. 
 
2.3. Threats to Passwords 
There are many types of external threats to a password, social engineering, physical 
intrusion, password guessing, and password cracking. Each of these threats to passwords 
has a place in risk analysis for security. Threats such as social engineering are handled by 
training a workforce in best practices with passwords. Physical intrusion is mitigated by 
having a security policy of locking doors or depending on the organization, physical 
security. (Sarkar, 2004) Password guessing comes in several different forms, including 
brute force attacks where the attacker tries to guess the password by using all possible 
combinations of characters, and dictionary attacks where the attacker uses a list of words 
to try to guess the password, and the attacker searches for the user
such as birthdays and names, to attempt to guess the correct password, and rule based 
attacks where an attacker defines a list of rules toward the creation of a wordlist for example 
at least 8 letters long contains 1 number, etc... (EC-Council, 2009) Password cracking 
attempts to create a string of hashes that has the same encrypted hash as the password. The 
password created by the new hash may or may not be the same as the users, but because 
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the hash matches, the attacker is granted access. The other method of compromise is when 
defenses in which case the organization will instruct users to change their passwords. But 
passwords through the predictable ways that users cope in creating passwords. 
A secure password should be able to withstand these attacks until the next 
scheduled password change. Different password cracking algorithms may be used with 
varying degrees of effectiveness. Kelley et al. (2012) further expanded on the research by 
Komanduri et al. (2011), in utilizing a leaked password list and the data collected in the 
Komanduri study (Kelley, et al., 2012; Komanduri, et al., 2011). The analysis reviewed 
both the ease at which a password could be cracked and entropy of passwords and allowed 
for an infinite number of guesses on each password. It was found that though NIST 
considers the password policies known as Basic 16 and Comprehensive 8 equivalent, 
Kelley et al. (2012) found that the Basic 16 was the more secure against a large number of 
guesses. Basic 16 requires the password to have at least sixteen characters, and 
Comprehensive 8 requires a password with at least eight characters, an uppercase, a lower 
case, a symbol, and a digit. In addition, Comprehensive 8 could not contain a dictionary 
word (Kelley, et al., 2012; Komanduri, et al., 2011).  The work done by NIST was an 
enormous step forward in providing a quantitative measure for the strength of the password 
away from using the same formulas for randomly generated passwords. However, the work 
done by Kelly et al. and Komanduri et al. serve to highlight some remaining flaws with 
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this system for quantitative analysis of passwords. This paper will serve to further highlight 
flaws in the way the NIST model calculates entropy. 
 
2.4. Cognitive Psychology Aspects of Memory: Recall 
When 
coming from Ge
human can hold 7 ± 2 objects in working memory. It is well established within psychology 
that this is the limit of human memory. At first glance this is easily applicable to passwords 
and many take this statement at face value and most passwords fall in the 8 character range. 
In addition, this rule is only applicable to the short term memory instead of long term 
en, Plus 
or Minus Two is used in psychology for recall tasks where a researcher gives information 
to a participant not information that the participant generates themselves. So this will be 
applicable to randomly generated passwords generated by a policy and given to a user not 
be utilized further due to the fact that all passwords in this study will be generated by 
respondents as opposed to randomly generated and that pas
long term memory rather than their short term memory. However, there are other principles 
of cognitive psychology that can be used in order to extend human memory for the purposes 
of password generation. 
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2.5. Self Generation 
 Cognitive Psychology does not provide much information in this area as most of 
the memory recall studies are performed by the researcher giving a participant information 
to recall later rather than the participant producing the information. However, research by 
(Muligan, Lozito, & Rosner, 2006). This research showed that memory effects were 
enhanced but with a few tradeoffs, which are not relevant to passwords such as text color 
and font. Vu, Bhargav, and Proctor eventually applied this directly to passwords using the 
log in was 33.7 seconds with 3.77 attempts made before successful login (Vu, Bhargav, & 
Proctor, 2003). Vu et al go on to show that patterns involving numbers and special 
characters can increase the memorability of passwords but that this comes at the cost of 
increased predictability of password structure. This can be shown to indicate the heavy 
load that passwords make on human memory and Vu et al. go on to document that there is 
a shown tradeoff between security and memorability in most password policies. This heavy 
load on memory leads some users to write down their passwords especially in cases where 
lockouts are used (Gehringer, 2002). Gehringer goes on to suggest methods to mitigate this 
coping mechanism by creating passwords that are anagrams of longer phrases. 
 
2.6. Cueing  Context Dependency 
It has been shown in cognitive psychology, when context is the same while both 
learning a subject and testing recall, the human memory will be much more effective and 
accurate in recall (Godden & Baddeley, 1975). In addition, by maintaining a consistently 
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themed environment at every interaction not just while learning and testing, it is shown 
that memory performance is increased (Pessin, 1932). Adding to this, Smith and Vela 
related to that particu
passwords this means that the user interface should be kept, specifically the log in, 
passwords. It should be noted that this context dependency will in no way affect the security 
of a current password only the ability to remember it in the future. This will also mean that 
the user can bring in habits from other experiences with similarly themed designs. In order 
to not incur any additional coping a unique interface for our website was created from 
scratch. This should help to prevent any cueing from commonly used open source 
interfaces. To limit the loss of memorability of the password, the interface of the website 
will not be changed throughout the duration of the study so as to help cue the user of their 
password.  
The implications of drawing from cognitive psychology literature for this study is 
that there will be a deeper understanding of why each password was made in comparison 
to most studies of passwords, which tend to use an overarching analysis strategy such as 
Markov chains in which some information, like longer patterns, may be lost (Yiannis, 
2013). At the same time, much of the cognitive psychology literature can be misused as 
well due to the fact that many of the recall and cueing tasks researched in the cognitive 
psychology realm are based on information that is generated by researchers and given to 
participants rather than generated by participants themselves. This makes it more difficult 
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to draw on each field without first considering how and by whom the information in the 
subsequent research was generated. 
 
2.7. Chunking 
Chunking is the concept in cognitive psychology that refers to t
better organize, store, and recall information better by storing it as several pieces rather 
than a whole string of information. Using the concept of chunking allows what appears as 
individual characters within passwords or a whole string to become meaningful words 
stored in the human mind as one concept rather than by their individual characters (Miller, 
1956).  By gathering characters together into meaningful groupings (i.e. chunks) the tax on 
memory can be kept the same or reduced whilst increasing the key space and entropy of 
the password. By considering the user of a password policy has certain known strengths 
and weaknesses in memory retrieval and then catering to these strong traits and minimizing 
policy reliance on weaknesses in human memory, password entropy can be greatly 
increased without increasing the strain on user memory. 
This can be shown in the structure of passwords; for example when passwords are required 
to contain numbers, it is shown that a significant portion of people will place a set of 
numbers and/or symbols at the end of the password (Komanduri, et al., 2011). While this 
reduces the tax on human memory that the password takes, some of the strategies people 
use to cope using chunking can be exploited by pass
(John the Ripper Wordlist Rules Syntax, 2015) 
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2.8. Proactive - Interference 
The concept of proactive interference states that similar past events will interfere 
in the recall of future similar events (Keppel & Underwood, 1962).While originally applied 
to short term memory it was eventually applied to long term memory (Postman & Keppel, 
1977). In an everyday example of this principle, many have experienced a moment of 
forgetfulness where they have parked a car in one specific spot or area and one day are 
forced to park else where one day. Then without thinking a person may go back to the 
location to which they are accustomed. Applied to passwords, this concept is the 
psychological framework that explains how a user will have a hard time remembering a 
password for a short time after changing their password. It provides the framework that 
states that multiple tests of this information will help the subject overcome these effects 
(Nunes & Weinstein, 2012).This psychological principal can also go to show that people 
maintaining similar content and/or structure in their passwords as a coping mechanism. 
 
2.9. Psychological Coping Mechanisms 
There have been a variety of patterns that have become apparent that a significant 
portion of people use on a daily basis with their passwords. These common coping 
mechanisms can be documented by information security specialists to help encourage 
future password creation to occur without these influences and by password crackers to 
take advantage of these coping mechanisms to break the security of passwords at increased 
speed. Florencio and Herley analyzed the password habits of 544,960 individuals over a 
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three-month period. They found that the average user has 6.5 passwords shared across 3.9 
different websites. In addition, each user has an average of twenty-five accounts that 
require passwords, and on average types eight passwords per day. Florencio and Herley 
estimate that at least 1.5% of users forgot their password every month (Florencio & Herley, 
2007). This study is notable for showing that users regularly cope by using the same 
password across multiple sites and have problems remembering their passwords.  
passwords was completed by Shay et al. (2010). This study had 470 participants who were 
requ
While a much smaller percentage of individuals, in this case 13%, wrote down their 
password, a much larger percent, 80%, reused a password, and 50% reported modifying an 
old password to create a new one. Each of these are considered coping mechanisms laid 
out within this study that participants can do in an attempt to comply with password policy 
requirements(Shay, et al., 2010). 
Memory is a finite resource and it has been shown that people cope in a particular 
way in order to reduce the load that passwords place on memory (Vu, Bhargav, & Proctor, 
2003). The cognitive load placed on memory is a heavy burden as the number of passwords 
scale up and accounts are used less frequently. The precedent exists that when people are 
asat, 1994). 
Thus, coping mechanisms can be framed as an attempt to provide leverage on that burden. 
These coping mechanisms include variations of passwords that remain upon 
password changes. The definition that will be used in this paper is any mechanism that 
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brings information form one password to another across password changes will be called a 
coping mechanism. Examples of this can include utilizing the same password across 
multiple accounts, doubling the password, slightly modifying the password by 
incrementing the number or special character, or even forgetting the password, requiring a 
reset, which often takes time and decreases productivity (Komanduri, et al., 2011). 
 
2.10. Perspectives on Password Cracking 
Many of the means used to think about and analyze passwords come from 
cryptography. In this way the password can be viewed as a key is in cryptography 
(excluding the one time pad). The similarities being that a finite amount of time is required 
to figure out the key as well as a password and a string of characters are needed in order to 
gain access to information. Unlike some early cryptographic algorithms, information 
cannot be gained from attempting to try incorrect passwords as in something like a 
Vigenère cipher.   In both cases, a relatively calculable finite lifetime exists where 
passwords and cryptographic keys provide security to whatever they are protecting. Unlike 
keys used in cryptography where best practice suggests using completely random 
information for the key, passwords normally do not ask this of users. This means that the 
passwords will not be as uncertain as random data. NIST has documented the lowering of 
uncertainty this causes in their model for entropy. The model NIST set forward does not 
go on to model any additional drops in entropy accounted for by knowing a us
password or passwords. While this model makes sense it assumes that passwords will be 
kept secret and not broken in the time given before a scheduled password change. This 
assumption has been broken rather publicly many times in recent years with account 
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information being leaked to the web with Google, Facebook, and LinkedIn all publicly 
confirming user information has been breached and publicly posted (Burnett, 
2015);(Kleinman, 2014);(Silveira, 2012). The traditional response in all cases to breaches 
such as these has been to instruct or force affected users to immediately change their 
passwords. The sense is that the affected accounts are now secure because the passwords 
are now different than the ones that were leaked. That is unfortunately not the case as said 
before passwords created by humans are not randomly created and humans draw from our 
own experiences in order to create passwords. The same psychological principles discussed 
earlier go into the creation of passwords in most often the same way to create similar new 
passwords. So that knowing a previous password means that it will probably be easier to 
break a new password from the same person.  
 This is made easier by freely available software that allows anyone to attack 
passwords (Metasploit, 2015; John the Ripper, 2015; THC-Hydra, 2014; Hashcat, 2015). 
These software packages allow passwords on a variety of systems to be attacked via brute 
force, dictionary, and rule based attacks. This allows for rule based attacks to be performed 
targeting commonly identified coping mechanisms in passwords, incrementing, doubling, 
passwords similar to input. Techniques such as Markov chain modelling and mangling 
passwords via probabilistic context-free grammars can also be used to break password 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
This chapter consists of the methodology, variables, study environment, samples, 
instruments, biases, approvals, data collection, and analysis. 
The study started with 1030 participants and dropped down at each iteration to a 
final of approximately 30 participants per policy for a total of 92 participants remaining 
throughout the whole study. Much of this loss is attributed to a respondents being paid 
less for iterations 2 through 7 than for iteration 1. This was determined to not affect the 
representativeness of the study by comparing the passwords of the respondents who 
completed all 7 iterations by policy of the study to all respondents who completed each 
individual iteration by policy. 
3.1. Methodology and Variables 
This is an experimental research study designed to gather 7 password iterations 
from 1030 individuals recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk for a total of 2434 
passwords.  These 2434 passwords were studied to classify the coping mechanisms used.  
Then the coping mechanisms were analyzed using the NIST measure of entropy to 
determine the extent to which that particular coping mechanism affects the true entropy.  
Finally, the coping mechanisms themselves were analyzed to determine if there are patterns 
in types of coping mechanisms used or patterns across the population.
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3.2. Procedure 
This password study tracked a participant
participation with a password changing once a week. Participants were recruited through 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. After each iteration was completed participants were invited 
back through an internal email service provided by Amazon so that no personally 
identifiable information was exchanged including email addresses. Amazon Mechanical 
Turk workers not already participating in the study through iteration 1 were prevented from 
entering the study in any of the following iterations through the use of the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk qualifications mechanism. The qualification mechanisms also allowed 
 Each invitation that 
was sent to participants included a link to the Amazon Mechanical Turk Human Interaction 
Task (HIT) which would provide a link to the study. Using Amazon Mechanical Turk as a 
proxy between participants and the researcher developed website allowed for efficient 
payment of participants. 
When participants first entered the website they were asked to register with the 
website. At this point participants were randomly assigned in to one of the three password 
policies. The participants were asked to enter their Mechanical Turk ID as a username, 
select a At each 
login participants entered the study to do a survey which related to information security. 
The first iteration the study simply asked for demographic information followed by the 
next five iterations asking basic understanding of information security. The seventh 
iteration consisted of questions relating to how passwords were chosen for this study and 
password practices across accounts. For iterations two through seven, participants were 
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asked to change their password after logging in to the website through a change your 
password option. Participants were prevented from filling out the survey until they had 
performed a password change. The specific questions that participants were asked are 
located in Appendix A of this thesis. The passwords were analyzed for a variety of security 
related metrics explained in section 3.3 of this thesis. 
 
3.3. Description of Variables 
The variables being studied include: 1) prevalence of coping mechanisms, 2) 
entropy, the measure of randomness and surprise within information theory. Entropy was 
measured under two sets of criteria: 1) the NIST model of entropy as laid out in the NIST 
Special Publication 800-63 and 2) the model put forth by this research designed to take 
into consideration the sequential dependency of coping over time. From this model, the 
coping mechanisms themselves were examined for their prevalence within the password 
policies.  
 
3.3.1 Types of Coping Mechanisms 
Coping mechanisms have been categorized into three categories 1) using known 
information, 2) partial repetition, and 3) easily identifiable patterns. In the using known 
information category, the coping mechanisms that are expected to be seen are usernames 
being used as passwords and passwords being reused in entirety. The categories of partial 
repetition contain coping mechanisms such and simply repeating information across time.  
The last category of easily identifiable patterns will contain easily recognizable 
patterns such as incrementing and using only one character in the entire password, 
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changing the case of a letter within the password, and common keyboard patterns for 
coping mechanism is as follows. 
For Using Known Information 
Iteration 1 
P a s s w o r d 




In this example I have shown how entire reuse of a password is assigned an value of 1 bit 
of entropy. The reasoning behind this will be explained in section 3.1.1.2 
For Partial Repetition: 
Iteration 1: 
P a s s w o r d a 





In this example what is seen is the data that has stayed the same over time is assigned the 
value of entropy for one character under the NIST Policy and any new information is 
word 
 
P a s s w o r d 
1        
P a s s w o r d x 
4        2 
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For Easily Identifiable Patterns 
Iteration 1: 
P a s s w o r d 1 






In this example what is seen is incrementing over time the numbers being incremented are 
not assigned any value of entropy in the coping model and any new information is 
evaluated as it normally would under the NIST policy. Each of these categories will be 
analyzed for their prevalence amongst the policy.  
 
3.3.2 Entropy Measures 
In the using known information coping mechanism of using a username as a 
password as well as reusing old passwords these passwords will be evaluated as 1 bit of 
entropy. The reasoning behind this is that most password crackers have the option to use 
the login information (username) as the first attempt for a brute force check of the 
n as 
 (THC Hydra Password Cracker, 2015) 
R a n d o m P W 2 
4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  
x x x x x x x x 3 
4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  
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Symantec published a study on zero day exploits indicating that for the average 
organization that is compromised it takes approximately 10 months before the intrusion is 
detected (Bilge & Dumitras, 2012). Most organizations have passwords expire after a set 
length of time usually on the scale of a few months (Scarfone & Souppaya, 2009). This 
means that most users have already had at least one password change since the organization 
was compromised or if the said organization has discovered the compromise and has 
implemented a mandatory password change. In most cases, the check performed on the 
creation of the new password will only check to make sure the password is different from 
the current password and conforms to the policy. If the malicious actor had compromised 
the passwords of the organization then it is customary for the passwords to be placed into 
passwords have become known quantities and are no longer secret. If the user then reverts 
Figure 1: THC Hydra Interface 
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count in this case and 
the reuse of the password should be treated as providing no security with 1 bit of entropy. 
The rest of the policy for assigning entropy values will rely heavily on the NIST model for 
entropy laid forth in the special publication 800-63. This way any new data within the 
password or data that cannot yet be attributed to using known information, partial 
repetition, or easily identifiable patterns will simply be treated as it would have in the 
standard NIST implementation of password entropy. 
One of the common coping mechanisms within password creation is incrementing. 
This is done by changing one letter or number usually on the end of a password to the next 
letter or number in the alphanumeric sequence. The example of this would be Password 1: 
xxxxxxx1 to Password 2: xxxxxxx2, to Password 3: xxxxxxx3, etc.  
In the case of incrementing the user will use a predictable and recognizable pattern 
in order to lower the load that the password places on his or her memory. Using this case 
above in conjunction with the NIST Model of Entropy there is one character change 
between password 1 and password 2, the first seven characters will be treated as a singular 
block and provide it with what NIST proscribes for the first character in a password 4 bits 
of entropy. Since the number, the 8th character, in this case is new information it will also 
be treated as a new character under the NIST model. This means it will be treated as the 
second character in the NIST policy providing it 2 bits of entropy. Since the next character 
is still new for password two and it is a number it will still receive the 6 bit special character 
modifier at this second password. However, if an attacker now knows password 1 and 
password 2 it is likely that they will have noticed an incrementing from one to two to three 
this will now be a predictable pattern that can be incredibly easily exploited by password 
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crackers. This is exploited by the password cracker by treating the alphabetic characters 
that stay the same in the password as a substring allowing the remaining characters to be 
randomly brute forced (John the Ripper Wordlist Rules Syntax, 2015) (Rule-based Attack, 
2015). So, in the third iteration two separate losses in entropy will be seen. The first is that 
entropy will no longer be given for the 8th character because the coping mechanism of 
incrementing has been observed. The second loss of entropy will be from the 6 bit bonus 
given for using non alphabetic characters, a number. This third iteration the number that 
increasing the key space by adding in numbers to the password is now lost due to the 
knowledge that only numbers will be used in this character space. This is done because on 
the password cracking side by specifying that character as a numeric variable (John the 
Ripper Wordlist Rules Syntax, 2015; Rule-based Attack, 2015). This same loss of entropy 
for the using only numbers can be seen in other passwords. For example, if a user only uses 
numbers in their password and it can be predicted that they continue to do so. The entropy 
bonus for using numbers or special characters will be eliminated from the calculation of 
the entropy. 
3.4. Demographics 
As part of the study surveys were  The 
demographics that were collected are a respondent
income, marital status, and field of employment. This information will not be correlated to 
password strength as predictors for the entropy strength or for the prevalence of coping 
mechanics as this is outside the scope of the research questions, but it is made available for 
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The original sample of participants used in this study is 1030 participants that were 
recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk web services. However, many participants are 
expected to drop out over the course of seven iterations of the study.  As for the purposes 
of this study as common for most applications if approximately 30 participants remain in 
the study per policy until iteration 7 then the sample will still remain valid (Morse, 2000). 
Having approximately 30 participants in each sample groups conforms to much of the 
literature on sample sizes in studies of memory effects in regards to passwords. (Vu, 




As this study relates to information security due to Institutional Review Board 
policies as well as Amazon Mechanical Turk policies, it was decided that it would be best 
to not form the data collection as a deception study. This means that there may be 
observation bias associated with the fact that the research participants know that they are 
involved in a research study focused on information security and may act differently in 
order to impress or satisfy researchers by creating stronger passwords than they would have 
otherwise. If significant results are observed of coping mechanism eroding the security of 
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a policy then it can be argued that in a normal environment where users are not being 
actively observed these coping mechanisms will be even stronger. 
 
3.7. Approval 
Institutional Review Board Approval was received for Protocol#1410015359 on 
November 11th, 2014. With approval for an amendment received on December 8th, 2014. 
The full application is attached in the section labeled Appendix B. 
 
3.8. Data Collection and Analysis 
Data analysis was broken down into four categories; within policy by iteration, 
within policy across iterations, across policy by iterations, and across policy across 
iterations. Research questions 1 and 2 were answered by the analysis of the coping 
mechanisms. The prevalence of coping mechanisms is shown within each policy by 
iteration and across policies (prevalence of coping mechanisms is determined by dividing 
the number of passwords that use coping mechanisms by the number of passwords in the 
policy). The prevalence of coping mechanisms was analyzed individually to show which 
policy are most susceptible to each coping mechanism. Entropy is given both under the 
NIST models as well as Post Coping Models along with Standard Deviations (SD). These 
entropy values were measured for significance using one sample t-testing against the 
minimum entropy levels allowed by the policy. This was used to determine the answer to 
research question 3 if the entropy fall below the minimum levels allowable by the policy 
and when policy the entropy levels fall significantly below the level of minimum entropy 
by the password policy the password policy is considered broken. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The thesis investigated the following research questions: What is the prevalence 
and extent of the coping mechanisms (using known information, partial repetition, and 
easily identifiable patterns) to which users engage by policy and across iterations? Do user 
coping mechanisms decrease the strength of password policies to such a degree that the 
increase of security sought by the stringent policy is negated? 
 
4.1. Overview 
The average entropy of all the passwords across the study is 32.51129 bits. Splitting 
the three policies apart and averaging across iterations with all 1030 respondents it is shown 
that according to the NIST measurements of entropy Basic 16 is the strongest policy 





4.2. Policy Analysis 
The study went on for 7 iterations first starting with approximately 1030 
participants falling to 91 by the end. As shown in the model for NIST Entropy below the 
passwords created throughout the study show a relatively consistent strength growing over 
time. 
Table 1: Significance in NIST Model by Policy by Iteration 
Using NIST 800-63 





D N Entropy 
ST
D N Entropy 
ST
D 
Password Iteration 1 335 27.8 3.5 343 31.3 4.6 350 37.0 4.4 
Password Iteration 2 164 27.7 3.3 171 32.0 4.4 161 37.8 5.0 
Password Iteration 3 107 28.1 3.6 107 32.2 4.1 98 38.2 5.1 
Password Iteration 4 85 28.2 4.1 87 32.1 4.3 78 38.4 5.0 
Password Iteration 5 47 28.5 4.0 49 33.2 5.1 44 38.9 5.1 
Password Iteration 6 38 28.4 4.0 44 33.0 4.1 34 39.6 6.6 
Password Iteration 7 30 29.2 5.0 30 32.8 4.9 32 38.3 4.4 
 
The minimum entropy of the policies are 24, 24, and 30 bits for the Comprehensive 
8, Blacklist Hard, and Basic 16 policies respectively. Statistical significance above the 
minimum entropy levels with p < 0.05 is shown in green. 
Under the NIST policy all three of the policies examined show that their entropy is 
significantly above the minimum requirements for the policy. This means that from the 
perspective of the administrator, the organization they are trying to protect is secured above 




Table 2: Average Length of passwords 
Lengths Comprehensive 8 Blacklist Hard Basic 16 
Iteration 1 10.56 9.91 18.32 
Iteration 2 10.45 10.04 18.70 
Iteration 3 10.72 10.23 19.14 
Iteration 4 10.82 10.21 18.91 
Iteration 5 11.00 11.47 18.89 
Iteration 6 10.92 10.77 19.85 
Iteration 7 11.47 11.13 18.66 
The thought that respondents went above and beyond the minimum requirements 
placed upon them by the policy is confirmed once again when looking at the lengths of the 
passwords that respondents created. The minimum lengths of passwords required by the 
policies were 8, 8, and 16 characters for the Comprehensive 8, Blacklist Hard, and Basic 
16 policies. In every iteration in every policy the average length was at least one whole 
character above the minimum requirement for length. 
This security is called into question once the coping mechanisms are taken into 
consideration and the passwords are examined over time. Using the methodology laid forth 
above coping mechanisms were examined and overtime showed to erode the security of 
the policy to levels significantly below the minimum standards set forth by the policy. Post 
coping entropy (PCE) measurements for each policy that are significantly above the 
minimum values for the policy with p < 0.05 are listed in green while Post coping entropy 
(PCE) measurements for each policy that are significantly below the minimum values for 




Table 3: Significance in Post Coping Model by Policy by Iteration 
Post Coping 
Analysis Comprehensive 8 Blacklist Hard Basic 16 
 N PCE STD N PCE STD N PCE STD 
Password Iteration 
1 335 27.6 3.7 343 29.1 8.1 350 35.1 6.4 
Password Iteration 
2 164 18.8 10.7 171 24.5 12.2 161 28.9 13.5 
Password Iteration 
3 107 14.3 12.0 107 16.8 14.9 98 22.1 16.8 
Password Iteration 
4 85 15.0 13.7 87 17.1 14.7 78 24.2 16.6 
Password Iteration 
5 47 14.4 13.3 49 16.6 16.0 44 24.2 16.7 
Password Iteration 
6 38 15.1 13.3 44 17.9 15.9 34 18.2 18.7 
Password Iteration 
7 30 17.2 13.8 30 21.7 15.0 32 19.5 18.0 
 
A major difference between the policies is the rate at which entropy is lost. The 
Comprehensive 8 policy falls below its minimum level of entropy of 24 bits with a value 
of 18.8 bits at its second iteration. This means that after only one iteration passwords have 
become public the policy is harmed by the coping mechanisms that users exhibit. 
The Blacklist Hard policy falls below its minimum level of entropy of 24 bits with a value 
of 16.8 bits at its third iteration. The Basic 16 policy falls below its minimum level of 
entropy of 30 bits with a value of 22.1 bits at its third iteration. The average level of entropy 
the minimum level of 30 bits. However, this did not meet the necessary levels of 
significance at alpha = 0.05, meaning at this point the post coping entropy was not 
significantly different that the minimum levels of entropy provided by the policy. In other 
words the policy was still secure. 
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This drop in entropy across iterations invalidates the security of the policy with 
only one disclosure of passwords for Comprehensive 8 and two disclosures of passwords 
in the Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 policies. This would mean that from the policy 
perspective, passwords of the Comprehensive 8 policy are not protecting users as well as 
the Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 policies.  
4.3. Sample Representativeness 
Table 4: Sample Representativeness 2 sample t-testing 
  
It could be argued that using the respondents that have not completed every iteration 
of the study biases results. In order to assuage these concerns, two sample t-tests were 
performed against respondents who completed all seven iterations against each and all 
respondents in the respective iteration by policy. Results show no significant difference at 
alpha = 0.05 between the respondents who completed all seven iterations of the study and 
those that did not.  
  
P-values Comprehensive 8 Blacklist Hard Basic 16 
Iteration 1 0.1042 0.8219 0.0734 
Iteration 2 0.9979 0.5480 0.1723 
Iteration 3 0.4431 0.3975 0.2874 
Iteration 4 0.8293 0.4186 0.2319 
Iteration 5 0.8607 0.3444 0.7025 
Iteration 6 0.6607 0.3125 0.9068 
Iteration 7 1 1 1 
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4.4. Comparing Policies 
Table 5: Post Coping Analysis by Policy by Iteration 
Post Coping Analysis Comprehensive 8 Blacklist Hard Basic 16 
 N PCE STD N PCE STD N PCE STD 
Password Iteration 1 335 27.6 3.7 343 29.1 8.1 350 35.1 6.4 
Password Iteration 2 164 18.8 10.7 171 24.5 12.2 161 28.9 13.5 
Password Iteration 3 107 14.3 12.0 107 16.8 14.9 98 22.1 16.8 
Password Iteration 4 85 15.0 13.7 87 17.1 14.7 78 24.2 16.6 
Password Iteration 5 47 14.4 13.3 49 16.6 16.0 44 24.2 16.7 
Password Iteration 6 38 15.1 13.3 44 17.9 15.9 34 18.2 18.7 
Password Iteration 7 30 17.2 13.8 30 21.7 15.0 32 19.5 18.0 
 
The Basic 16 policy was a stronger policy from the start of the study with 30 bits 
of entropy and remains stronger than the Blacklist Hard policy or the Comprehensive 8 at 
iteration 3, after all three policies strengths have fallen below their minimum allowable 
values. This is measured by showing a statistically significant difference in two sample t-
testing with the post coping entropy measures at alpha = 0.05 with p value of 0.0157.  
Although the mean of the Blacklist Hard policy is higher than the Comprehensive 
8 policy at each iteration in the study by iteration 3 the post coping entropy values are no 
longer significantly different from each other at alpha = 0.05 with p value of 0.1929. In 
other words, in terms of protection it cannot be determined which policy (Comprehensive 




4.5. Prevalence and Extent 















Coped in Basic 
16 
Iteration 1 3 21 22 
Iteration 2 82 50 46 
Iteration 3 73 57 48 
Iteration 4 51 47 34 
Iteration 5 31 29 21 
Iteration 6 23 22 20 
Iteration 7 18 13 17 
 
As iterations go on, more and more data can be compared to each of the previous 
passwords and more coping mechanisms can be identified. Two of the coping 
mechanisms in this study, partial repetition and easily identifiable patterns can only 
be identified with successive password iterations. So as passwords are subjected to 
more and more scrutiny as time goes on in this model as coping mechanisms 





Figure 4: Prevalence of Coping Mechanisms 
 
in the Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 with 21 and 22 respondents coping than in the 
Comprehensive 8 policy with only 3 respondents coping. The Comprehensive 8 policy 
shows a much greater prevalence of coping mechanisms in every iteration after iteration 1 
















Comprehensive 8 0.90% 50.00% 68.22% 60.00% 65.96% 60.53% 60.00%
Blacklist Hard 6.12% 29.24% 53.27% 54.02% 59.18% 50.00% 43.33%

















Prevalence of Coping Mechanisms























Using Known Information 1.19% 12.20% 25.23% 21.18% 19.15% 10.53% 13.33%
Partial Repition 0.00% 34.15% 45.79% 35.29% 42.55% 50.00% 43.33%





























Using Known Information 6.12% 13.45% 33.64% 33.33% 48.98% 38.64% 30.00%
Partial Repition 0.00% 14.62% 15.89% 19.54% 12.24% 11.36% 13.33%


















Figure 7: Extent of Coping Mechanisms in Basic 16 
 
As shown in the above figures the policies examined have different susceptibility 
to different kinds of coping mechanisms. The Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 policies are 
shown to be much more susceptible to using known information in the first iteration than 
the Comprehensive 8 policy. At the first iteration 6.12% of Blacklist Hard respondents 
used the coping mechanism of using known information, 6.29 % of Basic 16 respondents 
used known information and 1.19% of respondents for the Comprehensive 8 policy used 
known information. This trend fades away after the first iteration with the percentage of 
respondents using known information rising to 12.20%, 13.45%, and 11.80% in the second 
















Using Known Information 6.29% 11.80% 26.53% 25.64% 27.27% 32.35% 18.75%
Partial Repition 0.00% 21.74% 25.51% 23.08% 22.73% 14.71% 15.63%















Using Known Information Partial Repition Easily Identifable Patterns
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Respondents in the Comprehensive 8 policy are much more likely to use partial 
repetition and easily identifiable patterns when compared to the Blacklist Hard and Basic 
16 policies. For the coping mechanism of partial repetition at iteration 2, 34.15% of 
respondents in the Comprehensive 8 policy compared to 21.74% of users in Basic 16 and 
14.62% of respondents in Blacklist Hard. For the coping mechanism of easily identifiable 
patterns at iteration 2, 33.54% of respondents in the Comprehensive 8 policy compared to 
8.19% of users in Blacklist Hard and 4.35% of respondents in Blacklist Hard. 
As each successive password became known it became easier and easier to guess 
continue to maintain similar information 
across password changes. When taken into comparison with the previous NIST model it is 
discovered that entropy is increasingly lost as time goes on instead of gained.  It is 
discovered that this loss in entropy seen at the policy level is eroding the security to the 
point of ineffectiveness after the first disclosure of passwords in the Comprehensive 8 
policy and the second disclosure in the Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 policies. It is due to 
the qualities of the policies namely the more stringent requirements placed on users in the 
Comprehensive 8 policy that users cope more heavily. At the same time, the qualities of 
the Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 policy encourage respondents to cope less except in the 
category of using known information.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION  
5.1. Research Question 1 
What is the prevalence of the coping mechanisms to which respondents engage by policy 
and across iterations?  
By iteration two, 50.00% of respondents were coping in the Comprehensive 8, 
compared to 29.24% of respondents in the Blacklist Hard policy and 28.57% of 
respondents in the Basic 16 policy. By iteration 3 the prevalence rises to 68.22% of 
respondents coping in the Comprehensive 8 policy compared to 53.27% of respondents in 
the Blacklist Hard policy and 48.98% of respondents in the Basic 16 policy. Coping 
mechanisms are most prevalent in the Comprehensive 8 policy followed by the Blacklist 
Hard policy and finally the Basic 16 policy. This directly corresponds to the amount of 
requirements in the policies placed onto the respondents. In the Comprehensive 8 policy 
there were 4 requirements placed on respondents. (At least: 8 characters, 1 capital letter, 1 
lowercase letter, and 1 special character) this wide variety of requirements is compared to 
the 2 requirements placed on users in the Blacklist Hard policy (At least 8 characters and 
no words in the dictionary blacklist) and only one requirement in the Basic 16 policy. This 
indicates that the prevalence of coping mechanisms is positively correlated with the 
number of requirements placed on the user by the password policy.
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If coping mechanisms are treated as a function of the cognitive load that each 
requirement places on users then it would be best practice from a security perspective to 
create or choose policies with a limited number of requirements. Based on the results of 
this study it should be suggested that if a requirement is to be placed on a user through 
the password policy that the requirement should be minimum length as increasing the 
minimum length of the password did not serve to increase the prevalence of coping 
mechanisms. This may be because passwords that are longer can consist of multiple 
process of chunking thus reducing the cognitive load on memory compared to a similar 
length password consisting of random information. This memory strategy provides more 
support towards using longer passwords with less policy requirements. 
 
5.2. Research Question 2 
To what extent do respondents engage in the following coping mechanisms?  
The participants in the Comprehensive 8 policy engaged in coping mechanisms 
most frequently and most heavily by using by partial repetition and easily identifiable 
patterns. The features of this policy namely the special characters and numbers serve as the 
most frequent means of coping. That is the special requirements placed on users by the 
Comprehensive 8 policy serve as a means only to make passwords more predictable rather 
than increasing the entropy of the password. The Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 policies show 
the higher coping only in the category of using known information in a few of the iterations.  
These coping mechanisms of using known information can be easily stopped at 
password changes by securely storing past passwords in an encrypted database and using 
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them as a blacklist against reuse for future passwords. Another check to ensure that the 
change. Implementing these two steps could stop the coping mechanisms identified as 
using known information without noticeable increase in wait time from the perspective of 
the user at the password change. It could be argued that by preventing users from coping 
in this manner would cause them to move toward other coping methods but they will not 
be as easy to identify from the attackers perspective and would require further research to 
identify this movement. Additionally, if coping serves to reduce the cognitive load that 
passwords place on human memory then by banning some coping mechanisms it could be 
argued that this would reduce the memorability of passwords. This should be investigated 
in further research as to the extent of this possibility. However, as discussed before this 
could be mitigated in longer passwords consisting of multiple words if they exhibit the 
psychological principle of chunking. 
 
5.3. Research Question 3 
Do user coping mechanisms decrease the strength of password policies to such a degree 
that the increase of security sought by the stringent policy is negated?  
Coping mechanisms do serve to erode password security to the point that the 
password will not serve as an effective security measure in all policies. The difference 
between policies is at which iteration this happens. After only one iteration of passwords 
is disclosed the Comprehensive 8 policy can no longer be expected to provide a minimum 
standard of security of 24 bits of entropy. 
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This has wide implications for organizations that have experienced password 
leakages as the common practice in response to this disclosure is an immediate password 
change. This research indicates that this response will not be enough to provide the 
The Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 policy required 2 disclosures of the passwords before the 
policy itself fell below its minimum standards of entropy. Meaning from the organizational 
perspective the policy can still provide adequate protection after one disclosure of 
passwords and one iteration of changes. However, after two iterations of password 
disclosure the Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 policies can no longer provide the minimum 
standard of security. Taking this overview of the policies examined in the study it should 
be stated that the Basic 16 policy is the most secure policy due to its robustness against 
coping mechanisms compared to the Blacklist Hard and Comprehensive 8 policies as well 
as its resistance to loss of entropy through multiple disclosures of passwords. 
 
5.4. Recommendations for Future Work 
 The coping mechanism using known information consisted of using a username as 
a password and reusing old passwords in their entirety.  These coping mechanisms can be 
previous passwords from being reused. This should be the first coping mechanism 
eliminated due to the relative ease of implementation and low processing power required 
to maintain security. Blacklisting passwords against reuse is not necessarily a standard 
implementation for password authentication and not every developer considers security 
when developing websites. So, developing a standard library that can be used to implement 
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password authentication could serve to help secure many sites being developed by 
individuals without extensive training in security.  
Other more advanced detection mechanisms should be researched as well such as 
the Levenshtein distance algorithm to try to prevent users from coping at password changes. 
Other server side predictive mechanisms can be researched to prevent users from falling 
into coping patterns by warning users to not use a password similar to their previous 
passwords. But a balance must be found between processing requirements, wait time on 
password change, and user memorability. 
Further research should be done to develop a model that accurately represents the 
cognitive load that passwords place on the human memory. This would allow policy 
creators to more accurately estimate how much they are willing to stress or frustrate their 
own user base with a certain policy. This will allow policy requirements to be chosen that 
cater toward memorability and do not encourage coping mechanisms.  
In the field of risk analysis, future work can be done to better gauge the long term 
impact of mass password leakages and incorporate this into the risk framework for 
organizations. This can help to serve to increase the number of options for system 
 
 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
46 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Albanesius, C. (2011). Team Poison Hacks UN, Leaks Usernames, Passwords. PC 
Magazine Online. 
Bilge, L., & Dumitras, T. (2012). Before We Knew It: An Emerical Study of Zero-Day 
Attacks In The Real World. Symantec Research Labs. 
Burnett, M. (2015, February 9). Today I Am Releasing Ten Million Passwords. Retrieved 
from Xato: https://xato.net/passwords/ten-million-passwords/ 
Burr, W. E., Dodson, D. F., & Polk, W. T. (2004). Special Publication 800-63: 
Electronic Authentication Guideline. US Department of Commerce, National 
Institute of Standards and Technology. 
Dell'Amico, M., Michiardi, P., & Yves, R. (2010). Password Strength: An Emperical 
Analysis. IEEE INFOCOM Proceedings. IEEE. 
Eaton, J. (2011). The Political Significance of the Imperial Watchword in the earl 
Empire. Greece and Rome, 48-63. 
EC-Council. (2009). Four Types of Password Attacks. In EC-Council, Ethical Hacking 
and Countermeasures: Attack Phases (pp. 5-1-5-80). Cengage. 
Florencio, D., & Herley, C. (2007). A large-scale study of web password habits. World 
Wide Web, (pp. 657-666). 
Furnell, S., & Zekri, L. (2006). Replacing passwords: In search of the secret remedy. 
Network Security, 4-8. 
Gehringer, E. (2002). Choosing Passwords: Security and Human Factors. IEEE. 
Godden, D., & Baddeley, A. (1975). Context Dependent Memory in Two Natural 
Environments. British Journal of Psychology, 325-331. 
Hashcat. (2015, January 5). Retrieved from Hashcat: Advanced Password Recovery: 
http://hashcat.net/hashcat/
46 
John the Ripper. (2015, March 3). Retrieved from Openwall: 
http://www.openwall.com/john/ 
John the Ripper Wordlist Rules Syntax. (2015, March 5). Retrieved from Openwall: 
http://www.openwall.com/john/doc/RULES.shtml 
Kelley, P., Komanduri, S., Mazurek, M., Shay, R., Vidas, T., Bauer, L., . . . Lopez, J. 
(2012). Guess Again (and again and again): Measuring password strength by 
simulating password-cracking algorithms. IEEE Symposium on Security and 
Privacy (pp. 523-537). IEEE. 
Keppel, G., & Underwood, B. J. (1962). Proactive Inhibition in short-term retention of 
single items. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 153-161. 
Klein, D. V. (1990). Foiling the cracker: A survey of, and improvements to, password 
security. 2nd USENIX Security Workshop.  
Kleinman, A. (2014, September 11). 5 Million Gmail Usernames And Associated 
Passwords Leaked. Retrieved from Huffington Post: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/11/gmail-passwords-
hacked_n_5805104.html 
Komanduri, S., Shay, R., Kelley, P., Mazurek, M., Bauer, L., Cristin, N., . . . Egelman, S. 
(2011). Of Passwords and People, Measuring the Effect of Password Composition 
Policies. Vancouver: CHI 2011. 
Metasploit. (2015, March 3). Retrieved from Rapid7: 
http://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/download.jsp 
Miller, G. A. (1956). The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on 
Our Capacity for Processing Information. Psychological Review, 81-97. 
Morse, J. M. (2000). Determining Sample Size. Qualitative Health Research, 3-5. 
Muligan, N. W., Lozito, J. P., & Rosner, Z. A. (2006). Generation and Context Memory. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 836-846. 
Nunes, L., & Weinstein, Y. (2012). Testing Improves True Recall and Protects against 
the Build-up of Proactive Interference without Increasing False Recall. Memory, 
138-154. 
47 
Pessin, J. (1932). The Effect of Similar and Dissimilar Conditions upon Learning and 
Relearning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 427-435. 
Postman, L., & Keppel, G. (1977). Conditions of Cumulative Proactive Inhibition. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 376-403. 
Rule-based Attack. (2015, March 5). Retrieved from Hashcat: Advanced Password 
Recovery: https://hashcat.net/wiki/doku.php?id=rule_based_attack 
Sarkar, K. (2004). Two converging worlds: Cyber and physical security. Federal 
Computer Week, 56-57. 
Scarfone, K., & Souppaya, M. (2009). Guide to Enterprise Password Management. 
National Institute of Standards and Technology. 
Shannon, C. E. (1948). A Mathematical Theory of Communication. 
Shay, R., Komanduri, S., Kelley, P., Leon, P., Marzurek, M., Bauer, L., . . . Cranor, L. 
(2010). Encountering Stronger Password Policies. Symposium on Usable Privacy 
and Security (SOUPS). Redmond. 
Silveira, V. (2012, June 6). An Update on LinkedIn Member Passwords Compromised. 
Retrieved from LinkedIn: http://blog.linkedin.com/2012/06/06/linkedin-member-
passwords-compromised/ 
Smith, S., & Vela, E. (2001). Environmental Context-Dependent Memory: A review and 
meta-analysis. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 203-220. 
THC Hydra Password Cracker. (2015, March). Retrieved from THC-Hydra: 
https://www.thc.org/thc-hydra/hydra_pass.jpg 
THC-Hydra. (2014, December 8). Retrieved from THC-Hydra: https://www.thc.org/thc-
hydra/ 
Todd, A. P., & Benbasat, I. (1994). The Influence of Decision Aids on Choice Strategies 
Under Conditions of High Cogniive Load. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, 
and Cybernetics, 537-547. 
Vu, K., Bhargav, A., & Proctor, R. W. (2003). Imposing Password Restrictions for 
Multiple Accounts: Impacts on Generation and Recall of Passwords. Proceedings 
of the 47th Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (pp. 
1331-1335). Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. 
48 
Vu, K.-P. L., Proctor, R. W., Bhargav-Spantzel, A., Tai, B.-L., Cook, J., & Schultz, E. E. 
(2006). Improving Password Security and Memorability to Protect Personal and 
Organizational Information. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 
747. 
Yiannis, C. (2013). Modern Password Cracking: A hands-on approach to creating an 
optimised and versatile attack. Royal Holloway University. 
Zviran, M., & Erlich, Z. (2006). Identification and Authentication: Technology and 












Appendix A. Survey Questions 
Demographic Survey (Log In #1) 




2. What is your age? 
 18  24 
 25  34 
 35  44 
 45  54 
 55  64 
 65+ 
 
3. Where were you born? 
 North America 
 Europe 
 Asia 









 American Indiana 


















7. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 High School (or equivalent) 
 Technical/trade school completion 
 Some college 
 Undergraduate Degree 
 Some Post Graduate Work 
 Graduate Degree 
 PhD 
 
8. What is your primary occupation?  
 Management 
 Business and Financial Operations 
 Computer and Mathematical 
 Architecture and Engineering 
 Life, Physical, and Social Science 
 Community and Social Service 
 Legal 
 Education, Training, and Library 
 Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media 
 Healthcare Practitioner 
 Healthcare Support 
 Protective Service 
 Food Service 
 Building and Grounds, Cleaning and Maintenance 
 Personal Care and Service 
 Sales 
 Office and Administrative Support 
 Farming, Fishing, and Forestry 
 Construction and Extraction 
 Installation, Maintenance, and Repair 
 Transportation and Material Moving 
 
9. What is your income level? 
 $0 - $15,000 
 $15,001 - $25,000 
 $25,001 - $40,000 
 $40,001 - $60,000 





Survey Log In #2 
 

















Survey Log In #3 
 
1. Do you regularly back up your computer system? (Regularly means a minimum of 




2. If yes, please answer the following.  If No, please proceed to number 3. 
 Please indicate what you use for backing up your computer system. 
o Cloud 
o External Hard drive 
o Other 
 













Survey Log In #4 
 



















Survey Log In #5 
 
1. Which of the following do you have in your home? (please check all that apply) 
 Smart cellular telephone 
 Laptop computer 























Survey Log In #6 
 
















Exit Survey with Password Specific Questions: 
 




 If yes, please answer the following.  If no, please skip to number 2. 
  At which point did you start using this similar password? 
 Week 1 
 Week 2 
 Week 3 
 Week 4 
 Week 5 
 Week 6 
 Week 7 
 
2. Did you utilize a similar password in this exercise that you used on another  
account? Similar means using the same root word, or branch of the same 
word, with a different prefix or suffix, different placement of capital letters, 
different numbers, or different special characters. 
 Yes 
 No 
 If yes, please answer the following.  If no, please skip to number 3. 
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  At which point did you start using this similar password? 
 Week 1 
 Week 2 
 Week 3 
 Week 4 
 Week 5 
 Week 6 
 Week 7 
 
3. Did you write down a password during this exercise? 
 Yes 
 No 
If yes, please answer the following.  If no, please skip to number 4. 
  Only for this exercise, why did you write down your password 
(please check all that apply): 
 Too difficult to remember due to the policy requirements 
 Too difficult to remember over multiple changes 
 Too difficult to remember due to too many passwords 
 Regularly write down my passwords 
 Other __________________________ 
When did you first write down your password in this exercise? [Purdue 
students] 
 Week 1 
 Week 3 
 Week 5 
 Week 7 
 Week 9 
 Week 11 
 Week 13 
When did you first write down your password in this exercise? 
[Mechanical Turk] 
 Week 1 
 Week 2 
 Week 3 
 Week 4 
 Week 5 
 Week 6 
 Week 7 
 
4. Did you utilize any personal information to assist you in creating a password 





If yes, please answer the following.  If no, please skip to number 5. 
What type of personal information did you use? 
  
 Street name where you grew up 
 Date of birth 
 Name of person with whom you are close 
 Favorite sports team 
 School where you attended 
 Organization in which you are a member 
 Vehicle you have or wish to have 
 Other __________________________ 
 




6. Did you ever become frustrated by the frequency of password changes 




7. What type of device did you use to log in to this study? 
 Laptop computer 
 Desktop computer 
 Mobile phone 
 Tablet 
 Other ______________ 
 
8. In your previous experiences with passwords, have you ever been frustrated 




If yes, please answer the following.  If no, please skip to number 9. 
Was the policy that caused you frustration similar to any of the 
following (please check all that apply)? 
 Minimum of eight characters with a requirement for special characters 
 Minimum of eight characters with a requirement for capital letters 
 Minimum of eight characters with a requirement for numbers 
 Minimum of eight characters with a requirement for numbers, capital 
letters, and special characters 
 Requirement that you not use any words found in a dictionary 




9. Have you ever been frustrated by the frequency of password changes required 
by any site? 
 Yes 
 No 
If yes, please answer the following. If no, please skip to number 10. 
  
How often were you required to change the password? 
 Every 30 days 
 Every 60 days 
 Every 90 days 
 Every 120 days 
 Every 180 days 
 Every 365 days 
 
10. How many accounts do you use that have passwords.  
 0  5 
 6  10 
 11  15 
 16  20 
 21  25 
 25+ 
 
11. Have you ever slightly modified a password to comply with a change in 












Exit Survey with Password Specific Questions: 
 




 If yes, please answer the following.  If no, please skip to number 2. 
  At which point did you start using this similar password? 
 Week 1 
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 Week 2 
 Week 3 
 Week 4 
 Week 5 
 Week 6 
 Week 7 
 
15. Did you utilize a similar password in this exercise that you used on another  
account? Similar means using the same root word, or branch of the same 
word, with a different prefix or suffix, different placement of capital letters, 
different numbers, or different special characters. 
 Yes 
 No 
 If yes, please answer the following.  If no, please skip to number 3. 
  At which point did you start using this similar password? 
 Week 1 
 Week 2 
 Week 3 
 Week 4 
 Week 5 
 Week 6 
 Week 7 
 
16. Did you write down a password during this exercise? 
 Yes 
 No 
If yes, please answer the following.  If no, please skip to number 4. 
  Only for this exercise, why did you write down your password 
(please check all that apply): 
 Too difficult to remember due to the policy requirements 
 Too difficult to remember over multiple changes 
 Too difficult to remember due to too many passwords 
 Regularly write down my passwords 
 Other __________________________ 
When did you first write down your password in this exercise? [Purdue 
students] 
 Week 1 
 Week 3 
 Week 5 
 Week 7 
 Week 9 
 Week 11 
 Week 13 
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When did you first write down your password in this exercise? 
[Mechanical Turk] 
 Week 1 
 Week 2 
 Week 3 
 Week 4 
 Week 5 
 Week 6 
 Week 7 
 
17. Did you utilize any personal information to assist you in creating a password 
in this exercise? 
 Yes 
 No 
If yes, please answer the following.  If no, please skip to number 5. 
What type of personal information did you use? 
  
 Street name where you grew up 
 Date of birth 
 Name of person with whom you are close 
 Favorite sports team 
 School where you attended 
 Organization in which you are a member 
 Vehicle you have or wish to have 
 Other __________________________ 
 




19. Did you ever become frustrated by the frequency of password changes 




20. What type of device did you use to log in to this study? 
 Laptop computer 
 Desktop computer 
 Mobile phone 
 Tablet 




21. In your previous experiences with passwords, have you ever been frustrated 




If yes, please answer the following.  If no, please skip to number 9. 
Was the policy that caused you frustration similar to any of the 
following (please check all that apply)? 
 Minimum of eight characters with a requirement for special characters 
 Minimum of eight characters with a requirement for capital letters 
 Minimum of eight characters with a requirement for numbers 
 Minimum of eight characters with a requirement for numbers, capital 
letters, and special characters 
 Requirement that you not use any words found in a dictionary 
 Other __________________________________ 
 
22. Have you ever been frustrated by the frequency of password changes required 
by any site? 
 Yes 
 No 
If yes, please answer the following. If no, please skip to number 10. 
  
How often were you required to change the password? 
 Every 30 days 
 Every 60 days 
 Every 90 days 
 Every 120 days 
 Every 180 days 
 Every 365 days 
 
23. How many accounts do you use that have passwords?  
 0  5 
 6  10 
 11  15 
 16  20 
 21  25 
 25+ 
 
24. Have you ever slightly modified a password to comply with a change in 
















Appendix B. Institutional Review Board Application 
APPLICATION TO USE HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
Purdue University 
Institutional Review Board 
 
1.  Project Title:  Coping Mechanisms in Password 
Selection  
    
2. Full Review         Expedited Review   X   
 
3. Anticipated Funding Source:  INSuRE Grant 
 
4. Principal Investigator [ See Policy on Eligibility to serve as a Principal Investigator for Research 
Involving Human Subjects]:   
 Name and Title: Melissa J. Dark, Professor Technology Department, Knoy, 
(765) 494-7661, (765) 496-1212, 
dark@purdue.edu 
   
5. Co-investigators and key personnel [See Education Policy for Conducting Human Subjects Research]: 
 Name and Title:  
 Christopher Foreman, Assistant Professor College of Technology, Knoy, 
(765) 494-2558, (765) 494-6219, 
foremanj@purdue.edu 
 
  Technology, Recitation, 
bcurnett@purdue.edu 
 











Tec                                                                                     
      
6. Consultants [See Education Policy for Conducting Human Subjects Research]: 
 Jeffrey Karpicke, Associate Professor Psychological Sciences, Psychology,  
   (765) 494-0273, 
karpicke@purdue.edu  
                                                                                                 
7. The principal investigator agrees to carry out the proposed project as stated in the application and to promptly 
report to the Institutional Review Board any proposed changes and/or unanticipated problems involving risks 
to subjects or others participating in the approved project in accordance with the HRPP Guideline 207 
Researcher Responsibilities, Purdue Research Foundation-Purdue University Statement of Principles and 
the Confidentiality Statement.  The principal investigator has received a copy of the Federal-Wide Assurance 
(FWA) and has access to copies of 45 CFR 46 and the Belmont Report.  The principal investigator agrees to 
inform the Institutional Review Board and complete all necessary reports should the principal investigator 




    Principal Investigator Signature         Date 
 
8. The Department Head (or authorized agent) has read and approved the application.  S/he affirms that the use 
of human subjects in this project is relevant to answer the research question being asked and has scientific 
or scholarly merit.  Additionally s/he agrees to maintain research records in accordanc









    Department Head Signature         Date 
 
APPLICATION TO USE HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
 
9. This project will be conducted at the following location(s): (please indicate city & state) 
 X Purdue West Lafayette Campus 
  Purdue Regional Campus (Specify):        
  Other (Specify):       
 
10. If this project will involve potentially vulnerable subject populations, please check all that apply. 
  Minors under age 18  
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  Pregnant Women   
  Fetus/fetal tissue  
  Prisoners Or Incarcerated Individuals  
 X University Students (PSYC Dept. subject pool ___)  
  Elderly Persons  
  Economically/Educationally Disadvantaged Persons 
  Mentally/Emotionally/Developmentally Disabled Persons  
  Minority Groups and/or Non-English Speakers 
  Intervention(s) that include medical or psychological treatment 
 
11. Indicate the anticipated maximum number of subjects to be enrolled in this protocol as justified by the 
hypothesis and study procedures:   2,000______________ 
 
12. This project involves the use of an Investigational New Drug (IND) or an Approved Drug For An 
Unapproved Use. 
  YES         X NO 
Drug name, IND number and company:         
13. This project involves the use of an Investigational Medical Device or an Approved Medical Device 
For An Unapproved Use. 
  YES        X NO 
Device name, IDE number and company:         
14. The project involves the use of Radiation or Radioisotopes: 
  YES        X NO 
 
15. Does this project call for: (check-mark all that apply to this study) 
 Use of Voice, Video, Digital, or Image Recordings? 
X Subject Compensation?  Please indicate the maximum payment amount to subjects. $2.00    
   Participant Payment Disclosure Form  
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  VO2 Max Exercise?     
 More Than Minimal Risk?   
 Waiver of Informed Consent?  
       Extra Costs To Subjects?  
       The Use of Blood? Total Amount of Blood       
   Over Time Period (days)       
       The Use of rDNA or Biohazardous materials? 
       The Use of Human Tissue or Cell Lines? 
 The Use of Other Fluids that Could Mask the Presence of Blood (Including Urine and Feces)? 
 The Use of Protected Health Information (Obtained from Healthcare Practitioners or Institutions)? 
 The Use of academic records? 
16. Does investigator or key personnel have a potential financial or other conflict of interest in this study?  







A. PROPOSED RESEARCH RATIONALE 
 Password policies have become so stringent and cumbersome that users may stop 
creating strong passwords or enlist coping mechanisms, such as writing down their passwords or 
using them across multiple websites, to facilitate remembering them. These coping methods have 
the potential to undermine and weaken the effectiveness of these password policies.  Password 
policies, like those that require eight digits with at least one being a capital letter, one being a 
number, and one being a special character, are designed as authentication methods for access into 
when creating passwords within these policies. It is our theory that it is possible to identify a 
policy that eliminates or severely decreases coping methods while retaining significant strength.  
Additionally, we intend to collect fairly comprehensive demographic and user behavior data as we 
anticipate future analysis by other investigators. 
 
B. SPECIFIC PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED 
  Each participant will be required to log in to a website.  At the initial log in, each user 
will be assigned one password policy to create a password within.  In addition, the participant will 
be required to answer a survey indicating demographic information.  During six of the subsequent 
log ins, the user will be required to change his or her password and answer a short survey of 
questions on information security.  At the time of the last log in, the user will be requested to 
participate in a survey that will inquire into any coping mechanisms that were utilized throughout 
the study or frustrations that the user experienced. 
 
 The data collected will be the demographic information of the participants, the specific 
passwords  
66 
that were created, and the answers to the surveys. 
 
C. SUBJECTS TO BE INCLUDED 
 Describe: 
 The subjects will be students at Purdue University. There will be no additional 
requirements for inclusion.  
 There is no exclusion criteria for subjects. 
 The maximum number of subjects we seek approval to enroll is 1,000.  We anticipate 
only a Thirty Percent participation rate, so our final subject pool will likely be approximately 
Three Hundred per collection method.   
 
D.  RECRUITMENT OF SUBJECTS AND OBTAINING INFORMED CONSENT 
 Certain courses at Purdue will be participating in the project, and each student will be 
advised that for attendance purposes, he or she will be required to log in to a website after 
each class to answer one question from lecture that day 
 The students will be advised that a password study is also being completed, and will be 
given the opportunity to participate 
 Each student will log in each day he or she is scheduled to attend that course. 
 Upon the initial log in, the student will be randomly assigned to a password policy, and 
will be required to create a password that satisfies that policy. 
 If the student is participating in the study, his or her password will be collected and he or 
she will be requested to participate in an initial survey to collect demographic data. 
 Every two weeks, over a fourteen week period, every student will be required to change 
his or her password for the website (for a total of seven passwords to be created) 
 The passwords of the students who are participating will be collected and analyzed 
 At the end of the data collection, the students will be invited to participate in a survey 
regarding any coping mechanisms used throughout the study 
 
E.  PROCEDURES FOR PAYMENT OF SUBJECTS 
   There will be no financial compensation for participation in the study. 
  Purdue University Professors will be able to award extra credit to participating students, 
so long as the non-participating students are also awarded a non-related extra credit opportunity for 
the same amount of points that takes a similar amount of effort as participation in the study. 
 
F.   CONFIDENTIALITY 
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   The investigators do not anticipate having or keeping any names, telephone numbers, or 
email addresses of the participants.  Each user will be given a random identification number.  The 
list of names that connects to the user identification number for Purdue students will be held by Dr. 
Melissa Dark and Dr. Christopher Foreman in a secure location. 
  Attached to this application is the Data Management Plan. 
 
G.   POTENTIAL RISKS TO SUBJECTS 
  The potential risk is minimal, in that no personal identifying information will be utilized 
by the  
 investigators.   
  It is likely that the participants will use a password throughout the process that might be 
used in  
 another aspect of their lives.  The participants will be advised of this before data is utilized, and it 
will be  
 suggested that if the password used was not unique, that he or she may wish to change the other 
passwords  
 that are similar.  The participants will also be granted the opportunity to not have their passwords 
analyzed  
 once the data collection has been complete and the full study explained. 
  
H.   BENEFITS TO BE GAINED BY THE INDIVIDUAL AND/OR SOCIETY 
   Each of the subjects will have the opportunity to reflect on his or her own password 
selection, and how it might be advantageous to utilize stronger passwords throughout their lives. 
    Society is very dependent upon authentication measures such as passwords, but we 
believe our  
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  study will indicate that passwords are a very weak type of such measures.  Society as a whole will 
hopefully  
  observe the results and begin seriously looking at alternative or supplemental authentication 
measures. 
 
I.   INV -BENEFIT RATIO 
 The risk involved is no greater than that involved in every day life.  
 
J.   WRITTEN INFORMED CONSENT FORM   
   The Informed Consent Forms are attached to this Application. 
 
K.   WAIVER OF INFORMED CONSENT OR SIGNED CONSENT 
If requesting either a waiver of consent or a waiver of signed consent, please address the following:  
  1. We are not requesting a waiver of consent.   
  
L. INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH 
 Our research will not be international 
 
M. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS   
   Attached are copies of the surveys to be completed at the beginning and end of the study  
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proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTcomprehsive8iteration1; 
   var NISTEntropy1; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTcomprehsive8iteration2; 
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   var NISTEntropy2; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTcomprehsive8iteration3; 
   var NISTEntropy3; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTcomprehsive8iteration4; 
   var NISTEntropy4; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTcomprehsive8iteration5; 
   var NISTEntropy5; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTcomprehsive8iteration6; 
   var NISTEntropy6; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTcomprehsive8iteration7; 
   var NISTEntropy7; 
run; 
 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTblacklistHarditeration1; 
   var NISTEntropy1; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTblacklistHarditeration2; 




proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTblacklistHarditeration3; 
   var NISTEntropy3; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTblacklistHarditeration4; 
   var NISTEntropy4; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTblacklistHarditeration5; 
   var NISTEntropy5; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTblacklistHarditeration6; 
   var NISTEntropy6; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTblacklistHarditeration7; 
   var NISTEntropy7; 
run; 
 
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=NISTbasic16iteration1; 
   var NISTEntropy1; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=NISTbasic16iteration2; 




proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=NISTbasic16iteration3; 
   var NISTEntropy3; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=NISTbasic16iteration4; 
   var NISTEntropy4; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=NISTbasic16iteration5; 
   var NISTEntropy5; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=NISTbasic16iteration6; 
   var NISTEntropy6; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=NISTbasic16iteration7; 
   var NISTEntropy7; 
run; 
 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=comprehensive8iteration1; 
   var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST1; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=comprehensive8iteration2; 
   var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST2; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=comprehensive8iteration3; 
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   var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST3; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=comprehensive8iteration4; 
   var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST4; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=comprehensive8iteration5; 
   var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST5; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=comprehensive8iteration6; 
   var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST6; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=comprehensive8iteration7; 
   var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST7; 
run; 
 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=BlacklistHarditeration1; 
   var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST1; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=BlacklistHarditeration2; 
   var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST2; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=BlacklistHarditeration3; 




proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=BlacklistHarditeration4; 
   var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST4; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=BlacklistHarditeration5; 
   var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST5; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=BlacklistHarditeration6; 
   var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST6; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=BlacklistHarditeration7; 
   var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST7; 
run; 
 
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=basic16iteration1; 
   var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST1; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=basic16iteration2; 
   var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST2; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=basic16iteration3; 




proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=basic16iteration4; 
   var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST4; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=basic16iteration5; 
   var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST5; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=basic16iteration6; 
   var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST6; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=basic16iteration7; 





   input group entropy; 




   input group entropy; 





Interval and the line t  
proc ttest H0=0 alpha=0.05 data=comprehensiv8blacklisthard; 
   class group; 
   var entropy; 
run; 
proc ttest H0=0 alpha=0.05 data=blacklisthardBasic16; 
   class group; 
   var entropy; 
run; 
